In a dramatic turn of events, the Iranian presidential race concluded on July 5th with Masoud Pezeshkian, a heart surgeon and reformist, clinching victory over the ultra-conservative contender, Saeed Jalili. This election followed closely on the heels of a tragic helicopter accident in late May that claimed the life of President Ebrahim Raisi, sparking a snap election. Amidst this backdrop, voter turnout plummeted to a historical low since the 1979 revolution, recording only 39.9% in the first round and dipping below 50% (49.6%) in the subsequent runoff—a reflection of the ongoing boycott trend that also marked the 2024 parliamentary elections. Despite the absence of detailed vote breakdowns by demographic and geographic markers, the surveys prior to the election showed that the disengagement spanned various economic groups, cultural leanings, and ethnicities, with women and the youth under 30 notably predominating the ranks of non-voters.
A pivotal issue that dominated the electoral debates was the candidates’ visions for Internet governance and censorship. Pezeshkian’s and Jalili’s positions stood out sharply. Jalili, notorious for his role in the 2019 Internet blackout and his staunch opposition to international social media networks like Instagram, pledged to expand fiber optic technology nationwide and dramatically boost both mobile and fixed internet speeds. Despite these promises, his past actions have left many, particularly younger voters, skeptical of his commitment to improving internet accessibility in Iran, where mobile internet speed currently lags behind many neighboring countries, ranking 73rd globally, with an average speed of 37.36 Mbps and fixed internet speed stands at 154th globally, with an average speed of 15.28 Mbps.
Unlike Jalili, whose promises were viewed skeptically due to his past actions, Pezeshkian offered a pragmatic yet broad approach. He explicitly pledged to overhaul Iran’s internet infrastructure and combat censorship vigorously, recognizing these barriers as detrimental to the digital economy’s expansion. However, an analysis in the Asia Pacific Policy Observatory (APPO) May 2024 report reveals substantial hurdles that this former parliamentarian will likely face in reshaping Internet governance.
As Pezeshkian steps into leadership, his administration inherits a complex policy landscape shaped by the outgoing “purification” policy. This policy regime, which was deeply aligned with the supreme leadership’s stringent standards, has significantly complicated Internet governance by adding layers of bureaucratic oversight. Over the last three years, backed by governmental support, the parliament enacted the “Cyberspace Users Rights Protection and Regulation of Key Online Services”, as known as the “protection bill”, in 2023.
This legislation ushers in profound changes, tightening control over digital infrastructure, regulating online content, and reshaping governance structures. It has sanctioned considerable interventions by governmental and undemocratic bodies such as the Supreme Regulatory Commission (SRC), dominated by security and military officials. The SRC’s involvement has not only led to the securitization of the communications and ICT sector but also catalyzed a shift in the ownership of private tech firms towards entities affiliated with military forces, including the Revolutionary Guards (IRG). This transformation, coupled with other politico-economic dynamics in recent years, has been a central factor driving the increasing exodus of skilled technology professionals from the country.
However, the establishment of the new governance framework has not simplified policymaking; instead, it has further muddled the landscape by multiplying the number of decision-making and supervisory entities. This added complexity has amplified concerns regarding investment uncertainties within the digital economy, which are already exacerbated by stringent U.S. sanctions. Additionally, the data protection bill has languished in parliament for years. Given the prevailing disposition of the majority of lawmakers, who generally favor regime control over data flows, the prospects for this bill’s success are grim.
Amid these challenges, the faintest beacon of hope for many voters, particularly the younger demographic, may lie in the potential shifts in the exercise of authority by the presidential office and the incoming government’s members within key regulatory bodies like the Commission to Determine the Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC), the SRC, and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC). Yet, the legislative branch remains dominated by ultra-conservatives, and the supreme leadership wields overarching authority in broad policy-making decisions as outlined in Article 110 of the Constitution. This arrangement leaves substantial power to thwart even the modest commitments made by the president-elect regarding the fundamental rights of cyberspace users.
Written by Hesam Nourooz Pour