Satellite Internet is no longer a sci-fi concept, it’s a fast-evolving reality. Companies like Starlink (SpaceX) and Amazon’s Project Kuiper are launching massive constellations of low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites to provide high-speed connectivity across borders, deserts, oceans, and even conflict zones. The vision is compelling: universal Internet access, independent of traditional infrastructure.
But with this ambitious vision comes a pressing question, who governs the digital “space”? As these satellite Internet services beam connectivity from space, often without physical presence in the countries they serve, they are exposing deep cracks in the global Internet governance regime.
When Innovation Ignores Borders
Starlink is the poster child of this new frontier. With operations now in over 70 countries, it promises lightning-fast Internet even in the most remote locations. But its path hasn’t been smooth, especially when it comes to local laws.
In Pakistan, Starlink’s arrival was greeted with excitement, but regulatory friction quickly followed. By mid-2024, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) had only granted the company a provisional no-objection certificate (NOC) and warned it not to advertise or operate without full approval. But still, Starlink had bypassed critical national vetting procedures that all domestic ISPs must undergo.
South Africa took a firmer stance. The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) halted operations entirely, citing Starlink’s failure to comply with equity ownership requirements aimed at benefiting historically disadvantaged South Africans.
In Bangladesh, the government went one step further. New directives require all Internet, including satellite, to pass through centralized gateways, granting the state the power to monitor or cut off services during political unrest.
Across these examples, one theme repeats: states are increasingly alarmed at how satellite Internet can sidestep local control, taxation, and national security measures.
Signals Without Borders, Risks Without Rules
Beyond connectivity, satellite ISPs are introducing entirely new risks for national sovereignty and global security. While local ISPs must comply with strict regulations, pay telecom fees, and store user data locally, obligations that many satellite providers escape; these satellite ISPs often bypass local laws and taxes, because they don’t require physical infrastructure on the ground. This certainly creates an unfair advantage to traditional telecoms.
Worse still, security vulnerabilities are rising. In India’s Manipur conflict, several sources, including members of insurgent groups and local police reported that Starlink devices smuggled from Myanmar were used to circumvent official Internet shutdowns. These devices were later seized by security forces, highlighting the real-world security implications of unregulated satellite Internet.
During emergencies, states often shut down the Internet to control misinformation or unrest. But satellite services can continue broadcasting unless their ground terminals are jammed or seized, rendering traditional shutdown tools ineffective. In mid-June 2025, Iran deployed a near-total internet blackout, cutting connectivity amid heightened tensions with Israel. This wasn’t just a partial restriction, it was a sweeping national shutdown aimed at controlling the digital narrative during the conflict. Yet, Starlink was reportedly activated over Iran, with Elon Musk declaring, “The beams are on,” as thousands of smuggled terminals began operating inside the country. This move effectively bypassed the blackout, allowing dissidents and civilians to stay online despite government-imposed restrictions. Similarly, in Myanmar, over 3,000 smuggled Starlink units have enabled rebel groups, humanitarian aid workers, and cyber-activists to bypass ongoing military censorship and coordinate actions under the radar. These cases illustrate a growing trend: disruptions to emergency control, cybersecurity, and national sovereignty are no longer hypothetical, they’re already happening in plain sight.
A Growing Governance Gap
Despite the transformative power of LEO Internet, there’s still no global framework defining how satellite ISPs should operate across jurisdictions.
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) coordinates spectrum and orbital slots but lacks enforcement power over commercial Internet services. This is largely because traditional governance assumes providers operate within national jurisdictions. Satellite ISPs, however, deliver connectivity without a local presence, making it difficult for states to enforce regulations on data, taxation, and security.
This disconnect reveals a deeper structural problem: traditional internet governance models assume that service providers are rooted within national borders, subject to local laws and enforcement. Satellite ISPs, however, upend this model by delivering connectivity from space, often without ground infrastructure or in-country operations. As a result, existing legal frameworks struggle to assert jurisdiction, and states are left with little leverage to enforce data protections, tax obligations, or national security protocols.
Multilateral efforts like the WSIS+20 process and the UN Global Digital Compact have yet to offer clear norms or regulatory models to address this gap. Without updated frameworks, outer space risks becoming a legal blind spot, where commercial actors operate with limited oversight and accountability.
Reclaiming Control: A Roadmap for Regulation
To avoid turning space into a digital Wild West, a balanced and proactive regulatory approach is urgently needed. First, countries must develop clear and enforceable national licensing frameworks for satellite internet providers. These should include requirements for local representation, tax compliance, and adherence to data protection and sovereignty standards, ensuring that foreign operators are subject to the same rules as domestic telecoms.
Secondly, rather than relying solely on local internet gateways, governments in collaboration with industry and civil society, should explore technical and legal mechanisms that ensure lawful access, data security, and emergency coordination, without undermining rights or open access. This could include transparency requirements, in-country partnerships, or compliance with national cyber laws, provided they uphold international human rights standards.
Finally, a sustainable solution will require regional and global multi-stakeholder coordination. Multilateral bodies such as the African Union, Asia-Pacific forums, and the European Union can help facilitate inclusive dialogue between governments, industry, technical communities, and civil society to harmonize policy approaches. Ideally, these efforts should contribute toward a UN-backed protocol or soft law instrument governing low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite operations, one that promotes transparency, accountability, and respect for national sovereignty, while embracing multistakeholderism as a guiding principle in shaping the future of satellite internet governance.
Conclusion: The Final Frontier of Sovereignty
As space emerges as the new domain of global communications, Internet governance must rise to meet it. Satellite ISPs are challenging the authority of nation-states, exploiting regulatory loopholes, and complicating everything from tax enforcement to national security.
Without clear, coordinated policy, outer space could become the next digital frontier where no one holds the reins — not governments, not the UN, and not the people impacted on the ground.
The future of digital governance is not just underwater in fiber optic cables, it’s orbiting above our heads. And the time to act is now.
Written by Nawal Munir Ahmad (Reviewed by Jenna Manhau Fung)